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Abstract— Biometrics have a long-held hope of replacing 
passwords by establishing a non-repudiated identity and 
providing authentication with convenience. Convenience drives 
consumers toward biometrics-based access management 
solutions. Unlike passwords, biometrics cannot be script-injected; 
however, biometric data is considered highly sensitive due to its 
personal nature and unique association with users. Biometrics 
differ from passwords in that compromised passwords may be 
reset. Compromised biometrics offer no such relief. A 
compromised biometric offers unlimited risk in privacy (anyone 
can view the biometric) and authentication (anyone may use the 
biometric). Standards such as the Biometric Open Protocol 
Standard (BOPS) (IEEE 2410-2016) provide a detailed 
mechanism to authenticate biometrics based on pre-enrolled 
devices and a previous identity by storing the biometric in 
encrypted form. This paper describes a biometric-agnostic 
approach that addresses the privacy concerns of biometrics 
through the implementation of BOPS. Specifically, two novel 
concepts are introduced. First, a biometric is applied to a neural 
network to create a feature vector. This neural network alone 
can be used for one-to-one matching (authentication), but would 
require a search in linear time for the one-to-many case (identity 
lookup). The classifying algorithm described in this paper 
addresses this concern by producing normalized floating-point 
values for each feature vector. This allows authentication lookup 
to occur in up to polynomial time, allowing for search in 
encrypted biometric databases with speed, accuracy and privacy. 
Keywords—component; formatting; style; styling; insert (key 
words) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Convenience drives consumers toward the biometrics-based 
access management solutions. Studies show that 52% of 
smartphone users [5] want to use their fingerprints instead of a 
password, a further 61% want to use fingerprints to unlock 
their phones, and 48% want to use eye recognition. Biometrics 
have a long-held hope of replacing passwords by establishing 
a non-repudiated identity and providing authentication with 
convenience. While biometrics are increasingly becoming a 
preferred and convenient method for identity and 
authentication [4,6], there are currently serious concerns 
regarding the protection of biometric data. Biometrics include 
a wide range of information taken from a person, e.g., 
fingerprints, face, voice, iris pattern, etc. and his/her 
behavioral properties, e.g., gait, date, time, and location. 
Recent increases in the processing power and sensor 
technologies allow digital signal processing (DSP) algorithms 
to run in the time needed for a real-time authentication (1-5 
seconds, similar to username and password login processing). 
Unlike passwords, biometrics cannot be script-injected; 
however, biometric data is considered highly sensitive due to 
its personal nature and unique association with users. 
Biometrics differ from passwords in that compromised 
passwords may be reset. Compromised biometrics offer no 
such relief. A compromised biometric offers unlimited risk in 
privacy (anyone can view the biometric) and authentication 
(anyone may use the biometric). Since resetting the biometric 
is impossible, the privacy of biometrics is of utmost concern.  
Consumer privacy concerns have been exacerbated by 
recent security breaches, such as those at Ashley Madison and 
Home Depot. For biometrics to penetrate the field of 
authentication and identification, users must remove 
themselves as impediments.  
Current transport-level encryption technology provides 
strong protection of the transmission of all types of data, 
including biometric data, that satisfies confidentiality, 
assurance, and non-repudiation requirements. These methods 
protect from an adversary listening in on communication. 
However, current biometric techniques require the use of 
plaintext search for matching, which means the biometric is 
visible. This paper describes techniques for matching and 
searching that address this problem by conducting matching in 
the encrypted space, thus allowing for biometric data to be 
immediately encrypted upon collection. 
II. EASE OF USE 
Encryption has been widely used for several millennia to 
protect information during transport [8]. The nature of the 
information dictated the levels and type of encryption required 
to protect it in transit in case of compromise [9].  
The most popular form of modern encryption during data 
transit is the use of transport layer security (TLS) which is 
commonly called by its predecessor technology, secure socket 
layers (SSL). We generalize and abbreviate as (TLS/SSL). 
Additionally, 2-way SSL sits on top of TLS /SSL and is an 
identity protocol that uses a certificate exchange to identify an 
individual.  
 In the case of stored data, it has not been possible to 
encrypt all stored [15] data at the application level because of 
requirements for searching the data. Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) requires encryption mechanisms and 
additional policies and processes [10,11,15] for data 
protection because any operation on the data demands 
decryption of that data for viewing and editing. For example, 
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HIPAA [15] requires the encryption of data in transport and 
offers policies for the release and dissemination of that data. 
The policy for cryptographic strength in this case is meant to 
protect against compromise of PII databases in cases of their 
theft. If operations could be performed, such as search, 
without decryption, data need not be exposed to potential 
compromise. 
Biometric data requires further protections by processes 
and policy that introduce the need for additional mechanisms 
including more sophisticated encryption [19]. One-to-one 
record match given a reference biometric and a new input 
record has been solved [19] but encrypted match and 
encrypted search remain an open problem.  
The current state of biometrics is as follows: 
1. An enrollment takes place for a new device. This links a 
biometric to an identity. A key exchange takes place that links 
the enrolling device to an identity and a server. The biometric 
is stored either on the server or on the client. 
2. Each instance of a biometric differs. The key exchange 
from step 1 offers an initial layer of security. A likeliness 
value is then calculated between the initial biometric and the 
new biometric. 
3. A match result is then derived from step 2. 
Currently, biometric searches require that the biometric be 
stored in a persistent and plaintext form. Existing stores are 
not general purpose and require the participants to agree to 
store their biometrics. It has thus far been infeasible, from a 
performance perspective, to search biometric data, even when 
it is stored as ciphertext, because the match is not direct. Two 
biometric instances of the same person vary, when in 
encrypted form, processing time becomes unacceptable as 
identification requires decryption of the biometric, and still an 
exhaustive search. Lastly and in some ways more importantly, 
the biometric is not one-way encrypted, meaning that 
ownership of the decryption key can allow for access to the 
plaintext biometric data. 
A. Biometric Open Protocol Standard (BOPS) 
In 2013, no standard existed for the interoperability of 
biometrics or a set of best practices for biometrics. In July of 
2013, a set of researchers formed IEEE Working Group 2410, 
the Biometric Open Protocol. The initial standard described a 
set of web service interfaces and a set of inter-operable 
processing rules. Products were built using IEEE 2410-2015. 
In late 2014, it became clear that there were impediments 
prohibiting the large scale dissemination of biometrics. 
Vulnerabilities that were discovered in the initial BOPS 
specification, such as client-side malware attacks, led to the 
revision of BOPS in 2016 (BOPS II). BOPS II considers 
privacy and the threat of malware taking over a client device 
while simultaneously considering the risks associated with 
plaintext storage on the server. It provides a detailed 
mechanism to authenticate based on pre-enrolled devices and 
a previous identity by storing the biometric in encrypted form. 
BOPS II allows the match to take place in plaintext or as 
homomorphic encryption. The base practice is homomorphic 
encryption.  
BOPS I and BOPS II are based on the tested computer-
based implementation of the Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC). BOPS conforms to the TCSEC, 
which is the United States Department of Defense standard 
that sets basic requirements for assessing the effectiveness of 
computer security controls built into a computer system. 
TCSEC was created by the National Computer Security 
Center, an arm of the National Security Agency (NSA) and is 
also frequently referred as “Orange Book, Section B1.” BOPS 
also conforms to the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Directive 6/3 protection level 3, level 4, and level 5 (PL3, 
PL4, and PL5), and to the standards of the Multiple 
Independent Levels of Security/Safety (MILS) architecture. 
There are two primary use cases in which BOPS II could be 
implemented. The first is the one-to-one case: sending and 
receiving encrypted biometric data and comparing to an 
existing encrypted biometric sample. We consider this the 
authentication use case because given a biometric vector and 
an identity as input, we can authenticate (or deny) a given 
biometric vector if it matches an existing biometric vector 
corresponding to that identity.  
BOPS II also specifies functions for the one-to-many case: 
searching encrypted biometric records given a new biometric 
record. The only solution to this case is an 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛) exhaustive 
search in which each record is decrypted and compared. We 
consider this the identity use case because given a biometric 
vector as input, we can search and determine whether or not 
the given biometric is in a database. When storing profiles of 
users, we wish to use a biometric to find a user. However, 
even if we abate the concern for privacy, two biometrics from 
the same person will not match exactly. The inexact nature of 
this match leads a non-polynomial search, which is untenable 
and not implementable.  
Biometric identification in BOPS II may occur by storing 
the biometric in plaintext or the substantially more difficult 
method of storing the biometric data using homomorphic 
encryption, allowing for matching to be conducted in the 
encrypted space using Euclidean measurement algorithms. 
The risk to privacy is inversely proportional to the amount of 
time and operations that occur in the plaintext space. If 
biometrics are kept in plaintext one hundred percent of the 
time, this leaves a large window for any sort of privacy attack. 
Alternatively, if a biometric is gathered as ciphertext and all 
manipulations are done as ciphertext, there is no place where 
the biometric is plaintext and vulnerable. Matching in the 
encrypted space using a one-way encryption offers the highest 
level of privacy. 
BOPS II provides for data privacy in biometric store, 
biometric match and biometric search. Clearly, data privacy 
requires the encryption of the biometrics. The question is 
whether a solution exists that allows us to work entirely in the 
encrypted space. BOPS II as a specification offers a general 
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framework for biometric operations, but it does not offer a 
specific means of implementation. This paper provides a 
solution compliant with BOPS II for privacy-based match and 
search in a biometric-agnostic way, allowing for biometric 
matching in the encrypted space.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, 
we formulate the problem with conducting biometric matching 
and search in encrypted space. In Section 4, we discuss our 
Methodology, which includes designing a Neural Network to 
acquire a feature vector that is then sent through a novel 
classification algorithm, allowing for biometric search 
between log(n) and n time.  
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
The issue with current biometric schemes is they require a 
mechanism for: (1)  acquiring the biometric, (2) 
plaintext biometric match, (3) encrypting the biometric, (4) 
performing a Euclidean-measurable match, and (5) searching 
using a one-to-many indexing scheme. 
To do steps 1 through 5 for every biometric is time 
consuming, error-prone and frequently nearly impossible to do 
before the biometric becomes deprecated. Our goal is to 
develop a scheme, techniques and technologies that allow us 
to work with biometrics in a privacy-protected and 
polynomial-time based way that is also biometric-agnostic. 
We will use machine learning to solve problems (2) - (5). We 
focus much of our effort on (5) and allow points (1) - (4) to 
provide supplemental information. 
Finally, complete content and organizational editing before 
formatting. Please take note of the following items when 
proofreading spelling and grammar: 
A. Encryption 
Since we have little control over devices such as cameras or 
sensors, the biometric template arrives as plaintext. If we 
encrypt it immediately and only process it as ciphertext, we 
have the maximum practical level of privacy. An important 
part of offering this highest level of privacy is a one-way 
encryption algorithm, meaning that given ciphertext, there is 
no mechanism to get to the original plaintext. Many one-way 
encryption algorithms exist, such as MD5 and SHA-512. 
However, these algorithms are not homomorphic. This means 
we cannot do a closeness match between two ciphertext vectors 
using Euclidean measurements.  
This paper explores and produces a general purpose 
solution that produces biometric ciphertext that is Euclidean-
measurable. We do this using a Neural Network. We then 
apply a classification algorithm to allow for one-to-many 
identification. This solution maximizes privacy and runs 
between 𝑂𝑂(1) and 𝑂𝑂(log(𝑛𝑛)) time. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
In this Section, we first design a Neural Network for the 
encryption of a biometric, and then use a classification 
algorithm on the encrypted output to perform both one-to-one 
authentication and one-to-many identification. Matrix 
multiplications and several other operations are used in the 
neural network to translate an Initial Biometric Vector (IBV) 
into a Euclidean Measurable Feature Vector (EMFV), which is 
then stored. When a new biometric is submitted for 
matching/identification, this Current Biometric Vector (CBV) 
is sent through the neural network so it can be translated into 
an EMFV. These EMFVs are then used in a separate 
classification algorithm to perform one-to-many search 
between 𝑂𝑂(1) and 𝑂𝑂(log(𝑛𝑛)) time. 
This paper uses the biometric of facial recognition to test 
the approach. However, the method was designed specifically 
to be implementable regardless of the type of biometric. We 
believe similar techniques will work for voice, fingerprints and 
a host of other biometrics. This is due to the use of feature 
vectors for encryption, which are the output of a neural 
network. The proposed classification algorithm acts on these 
feature vectors. This allows this general approach to be used 
despite varying biometrics, neural networks, and data.  
A. Our Defined Neural Network 
We use a convolutional neural network for processing 
images and determining the correct cost function. The spatial 
size of the output volume can be computed as a function of the 
input volume size 𝑊𝑊, the kernel field size of the convolutional 
layer neurons 𝐾𝐾, the stride with which they are applied 𝑆𝑆, and 
the amount of zero padding 𝑃𝑃 used on the border. The formula 
for calculating how many neurons "fit" in a given volume is 
given by 1 + (𝑊𝑊 −𝐾𝐾 + 2𝑃𝑃)/𝑆𝑆. One of the objectives of this 
research is to find the ideal number of neurons and layers in the 
neural network. Fig. 1 below shows an activation function as a 
summation of a matrix of weights times the 𝑋𝑋  values. This 
yields a 𝑌𝑌 value.  
 
 
Figure 1. Example of Activation Function 
The neural network is initially trained as a classifier using 
labeled biometric data. However, the traditional use of a neural 
network in this regard is neither novel nor scalable as it 
assumes the person is already stored and the images, from the 
training, are present. One cannot assume, or even fathom that 
we can train on every person available to our set.  
Instead, when an IBV is introduced into the neural network, 
the vector used in the n-1 layer can be used as a unique feature 
vector to identify that IBV but in the homomorphic encrypted 
space. This feature vector is Euclidean-measurable and 
encrypted.  
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The feature vector replaces the biometric vector. The 
feature vector is a list of 256 floating-point numbers. It is 
impossible to reconstruct the biometric from a list of 256 
floating-point numbers. The feature vector is therefore a one-
way encryption. Feature vectors have the property of being 
Euclidean-measurable.  
Appendix 1 shows an example of our neural network. The 
initial image is applied to the neural network. We see the 
resulting softmax, which shows which of the defined “buckets” 
the image belongs. In this bucket, we have the images for the 
given individual. Next it shows us the matrix computations to 
create the softmax. Two convolutional steps prior to the 
softmax is fc7-conv which has the output from convolutional 
layer 7. This output is the feature vector. 
For example, if the feature vector for person 𝑋𝑋 , as 256 
values, when applied to the classifying function results in a 
floating-point number of 𝑌𝑌 . For all values near 𝑌𝑌 , we can 
identify the individual. We can only do this if our feature 
vector is Euclidean-measurable and classifying function is 
stable. 
Appendix 2, shows us the entire network. We have a 
variety of convolutional layers together with a rectifier (ReLU) 
and pooling nodes. The rectifier is, as of the publication of this 
paper, the most popular activation function for deep neural 
networks. The rectifier is an activation function defined as 
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = max(0, 𝑥𝑥). 
Beyond ReLU, our convolutional network uses pooling 
which is a form of non-linear down-sampling. We use a type of 
pooling algorithm called maxpooling, which partitions input 
images into a set of non-overlapping rectangles and, for each 
such sub-region, outputs the maximum. Once a feature has 
been found, its exact location is not as important as its relation 
to other features. The function of the pooling layer is to 
progressively reduce the spatial size of the representation to 
reduce the amount of parameters and computation in the 
network. Through the use of convolutions, ReLU and 
maxpooling, we get a reasonable size vector of 256 to use for 
matching, classifying and comparison.  
The resultant encrypted, Euclidean-measurable feature 
vectors (EMFVs) from the neural network can later be used in 
the classification algorithm to receive a scalar value that can be 
compared to the feature vectors from other biometrics. 
B. Our Classification Algorithm 
To use the feature vector for storage, we need to index it. 
For indexing we use a classification algorithm that, given an 
input feature vector, returns a floating-point number. This 
floating-point number is an index for storage. The 
classification algorithm has a dependence on a high-quality 
mean vector, which aids in creating distances between persons. 
The classification algorithm allows us to search and find the 
enrolled person in polynomial time. 
The aforementioned floating-point number allows us to 
index search for a previously stored biometric. An appropriate 
classification algorithm gives us the intended person based on 
the input feature vector. Given a feature vector of 256 
nonnegative integers, the procedure given below classifies this 
vector into the appropriate pool. Each pool is for one and only 
one distinct person. If the person is not found, it is assumed the 
algorithm will look for neighboring persons to complete the 
search. 
The idea is to use distances to classify unknown vectors of 
the form 𝑥𝑥 = (𝑥𝑥0, 𝑥𝑥1,⋯ , 𝑥𝑥255). Unless otherwise noted, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is a 
nonnegative integer for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1,⋯ ,255}. We define the 
distance between two vectors as 𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = ∑ |𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖|255𝑖𝑖=0 . Let 
𝑈𝑈 be the set of known vectors and |𝑈𝑈| the number of vectors in 
𝑈𝑈. We will assume |𝑈𝑈| < ∞. 
The mean of all vectors in 𝑈𝑈  is given by 𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 =1 |𝑈𝑈|⁄ ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥∈𝑈𝑈  and can be calculated explicitly if |𝑈𝑈|  is 
sufficiently small. If |𝑈𝑈| is not sufficiently small, then 𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 can 
be approximated. Note that the coordinates of 𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈  are not 
necessarily nonnegative integers. 
Consider a partition of 𝑈𝑈 as 𝑈𝑈 = ∐ 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . We have observed 
experimentally that for each 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗, there exist 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 ∈ (0,∞) such 
that 𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 ,𝑦𝑦) ∈ [𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗]  for all 𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 . Moreover, [𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗] is 
disjoint from [𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘, 𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘]  for 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑘𝑘 . In other words, bands of 
distances from the mean vector can be used to classify 
unknown vectors. 
Given a vector 𝑦𝑦 ∉ 𝑈𝑈, we calculate 𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 ,𝑦𝑦) to determine 
how to uniquely extend partitions of U to partitions of 𝑉𝑉 =
𝑈𝑈 ∪ {𝑦𝑦} . If 𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 ,𝑦𝑦) ∉ [𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 ,𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗]  for all j, then the interval [𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 , 𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗] closest to y is chosen and the subset 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 associated with 
this interval is chosen to include y in the extension of the 
original partition to a partition of 𝑉𝑉 . If it happens that y is 
equidistant to two different intervals, then the subset in which 
to include y in the partition of 𝑉𝑉 is not well-defined. In this 
case, the numerical results should be re-examined and a better 
choice for at least one of the two intervals equidistant to 𝑦𝑦 
should be made. 
 
V. RESULTS 
We used 257 images for training. The Neural Network is a 
32 node, 8 convolution layer network. The training allocates 
the appropriate weights to the network. With this trained 
network, we apply a new face for either storage or lookup. In 
either case, we put the face through the neural network and at 
convolutional layer 7 we have a feature vector.  
Using a set of images, and applying our neural network we 
receive the following EMFV at convolutional layer 7. An 
example of part of one such output is below: 
0.83215457, 0, 0.97926098, 2.34792662, 6.1617651, 
6.31998634 2.36983943, 3.691468, 3.82195878, 0.94054723, 
1.48430574, 3.68506813, 3.71155834, 0.73430908, 
1.13436747, 2.62325954, 2.40342426, 1.69623852, 
1.55817235, 1.41169822, 0.89341599 
For a set of 15 persons and 257 images the results are 
desirable. The feature vector classifies to a specific person 
within runtime 𝑂𝑂(1) . Using the algorithm, as specified in 
Section 4.1, we have ranges of three individuals. Using 
normalized vectors, the resulting ranges of images are as 
follows. For Person 1, our normalized distances range from .85 
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to 1.12. For Person 2 our range is from 1.18 to 1.32. For Person 
3, our normalized distances range from .39 to .68.  
As a practical example, subsequent IBVs of person one, 
when given to the neural network and classification algorithm, 
will produce results between .85 and 1.12. Similarly, 
subsequent IBVs for person 3 will yield results between .39 
and .68. These acceptable ranges offer us banding for each 
person. Therefore, the idea is we see banding and no collisions 
for the bands between persons. For small sets of data, our 
results are exact.  
VI. DISCUSSION 
 Our hypothesis is as follows: 
1. We can use deep learning to do more than categorize. 
2. The feature vectors from machine learning are 
Euclidean-measurable and stable. 
3. We use feature vectors for one to one match 
guaranteeing us homomorphic encryption. We have the highest 
level of privacy. 
4. Our classification algorithm allows us to search, given a 
feature vector as input. 
Conclusions 1 through 3 appear exact. Conclusion 4 
requires more data and testing.  
The numeric ranges after the application of our 
classification algorithm offer us buckets for search. Each 
bucket results in the selection of an individual.  
VII. FUTURE WORK 
We anticipate continued work in the area of indexing based 
on feature vectors. The results hold for smaller sets, we wish to 
see if the indexing and classification algorithm holds over set 
of hundreds of thousands of individuals. 
We will also experiment with the mean vectors looking for 
wider banding between the categorization values on a person 
by person basis. 
We also will do a combinatorial analysis to determine the 
order of the classification algorithm. We will find if the 
runtime of the classifier is 𝑂𝑂(1) or 𝑂𝑂(log(𝑛𝑛)). 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we see that deep learning solves the 
homomorphic encryption problem for one to one match. 
Adding our classification algorithm, to the results of the neural 
network offers us a solution for search.  
We match based upon the IBV as input, the application of 
the neural network the resulting feature vector. We then use the 
feature vector, with our classification algorithm to provide 
indexed search. 
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